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Abstract 
Doctored photographs can shape what people believe and remember about prominent public 
events, perhaps due to their apparent credibility. In three studies, subjects completed surveys 
about the 2012 London Olympic torch relay (Experiment 1) or the 2011 Royal Wedding of 
Prince William and Kate Middleton (Experiments 2-3). Some were shown a genuine photo of 
the event; others saw a doctored photo that depicted protesters and unrest. A third group of 
subjects saw a doctored photo whose inauthenticity had been made explicit, either by adding 
a written disclaimer (Experiment 1) or by making the digital manipulation deliberately poor 
(Experiments 2-3). In all three studies, doctored photos had small effects on a subset of 
subjects’ beliefs about the events. Of central interest though, comparable effects also emerged 
when the photos were overtly inauthentic. These findings suggest that cognitive mechanisms 
other than credibility—such as familiarity misattribution and mental imagery—can rapidly 
influence beliefs about past events even when the low credibility of a source is overt. 
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Changing Beliefs about Past Public Events with Believable and Unbelievable Doctored 
Photographs 
In 2011, a blatantly fake photograph of three government officials—whose feet 
seemed not to be touching the ground—appeared on a Chinese government website. The 
photo went viral, leading two New York Times bloggers to report “China admits officials 
cannot levitate” (Mackey & Harris, 2011). Their blog post quoted one Chinese citizen, who 
complained “Even a rank amateur like myself can tell that this was a Photoshop job, and they 
had the nerve to put this on the home page!”. Doctored photos of diverse quality are common 
in the modern mass media, and there is a current resurgence of interest in people’s ability to 
detect these forgeries as an instance of so-called ‘fake news’ (Edkins, 2016). Recent 
psychological studies show that people’s ability in this respect is very often suboptimal 
(Nightingale, Wade, & Watson, in press); in fact, doctored images can sometimes lead people 
to believe in—and even remember—events that never occurred (e.g., Frenda, Knowles, 
Saletan, & Loftus, 2013; Sacchi, Agnoli, & Loftus, 2007). But does this rapid distortive 
influence only occur when viewers mistakenly treat the forgeries as genuine? The research 
reported here tackles this question. 
Doctored photos as credible evidence 
For decades, research has demonstrated numerous ways by which people’s beliefs 
about their personal past can be altered (Loftus, 2005; Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). 
Many of these studies have relied on apparently highly credible evidence as a vehicle to 
deliver suggestive information. For example, studies into false autobiographical memories 
have recruited family members as credible sources of suggestion (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; 
Ost, Foster, Costall, & Bull, 2005; Scoboria, Wysman, & Otgaar, 2012), whereas in typical 
misinformation studies, the credible sources are usually the experimenters themselves (Loftus 
& Palmer, 1974; Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006). Another credible source of false 
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information used in several studies is doctored photos (Garry & Gerrie, 2005). Such images 
are rather unique forms of suggestion, as they can provide seemingly authoritative ‘proof’ of 
fictional events’ occurrence. Consequently, seeing credible digital forgeries can lead people 
to report altered attitudes toward branded products, to falsely remember experiences that 
never occurred, to falsely internalize guilt for a prohibited act, and to snitch on innocent peers 
(Hellenthal, Howe, & Knott, 2016; Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria, 2012; Nash & Wade, 2009; 
Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009; Wade, Garry, Nash, & Harper, 2010; Wade, Garry, Read, & 
Lindsay, 2002; Wade, Green, & Nash, 2010; Wright, Nash, & Wade, 2015). 
As well as altering people’s personal histories, doctored images can also influence 
people’s beliefs about significant public events. In one study, researchers doctored a photo of 
a peaceful protest in Rome, adding photographic details to falsely suggest that unrest and 
violence had occurred (Sacchi et al., 2007). Exposure to this doctored photo changed the way 
Italian subjects remembered the events that had occurred. Compared to subjects who saw the 
genuine photos, those who saw the doctored version reported that the protest had been more 
confrontational, violent, and negative, and that more damage, injuries and even deaths had 
occurred. Similarly, misled subjects said they would be less eager to participate in similar 
demonstrations in future. In a follow-up, Frenda et al.’s (2013) subjects saw doctored photos 
of fabricated political events, such as President Obama shaking hands with the former Iranian 
president, or President George W. Bush on vacation with a famous baseball player in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. After viewing the photos, nearly half of people said they 
remembered the false events happening—especially those events that suited their own 
political agendas. 
How important is credibility? 
Sacchi et al. (2007) proposed that the apparent authenticity of doctored photos is a 
crucial ingredient in their potency, perhaps because this authenticity makes people less likely 
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to immediately reject them as false, and instead to more readily elaborate on what they might 
have seen. In line with this account, there is abundant evidence that people’s susceptibility to 
suggestion depends on what or whom they believe the source of the false information to be 
(Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; French, Garry, & Mori, 2011; Scoboria et al., 2012). These studies 
indicate that for suggestions to influence our cognitions about the past, they must normally be 
understood to originate from credible, trustworthy sources (see Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015 
for further discussion). 
Yet despite strong evidence for the role of credibility, numerous other studies show us 
that information does not always need to be authoritative to shape what we believe. This 
point is demonstrated notably in studies of the illusory truth effect, where repeated exposure 
to purported ‘facts’ leads people, over time, to increasingly accept those facts as truth, even 
when the source of the facts is explicitly identified as unreliable (Henkel & Mattson, 2011), 
and when the facts are initially known to be untrue (Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015). 
Similar acceptance of misinformation in lieu of source credibility has also been observed in 
studies that involve photographic sources. Indeed, in Nash, Wade, and Brewer’s (2009) study, 
a credibility mechanism alone accounted for most of the effect of doctored video-recordings 
on people’s beliefs, but could not explain the entire effect. Those authors concluded that part 
of the effect of photographic images lies in their ability to evoke feelings of familiarity with 
the events they depict. In line with this conclusion, Newman and colleagues have found that 
when people evaluate trivia claims, they are more likely to judge those claims as true if the 
claims are shown alongside topic-relevant photos that provide no probative evidence 
(Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012; Newman et al., 2015). In earlier 
studies, similarly nonprobative photos have induced false memories of news headlines 
(Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011), recent personal experiences (Henkel, 2011), 
and childhood experiences (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). 
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Photos can be influential, then, even when they are not treated as credible evidence of 
what happened. Yet this may be true only when those photos seem incidental and innocuous, 
rather than when they can be explicitly identified as a source of misinformation. In these 
latter cases, the low credibility of the photo may alert viewers to avoid heuristic cues to truth. 
For example, we know from several other studies that false beliefs are less likely to occur 
when people are vigilant to suggestive influence, such as when they are forewarned that they 
are about to see information that may mislead them (Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; 
Gerrie & Garry, 2011; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982). Based on these findings, we might 
expect that when people see photos that are overtly fake, they would be vigilant to possible 
influence and would therefore resist being misled by those photos. At present, we do not 
know whether this is the case, or whether other mechanisms can still lend influence to 
doctored photos even when their credibility is low. Indeed, it is noteworthy that even when 
forewarned about misleading information, people’s susceptibility to suggestive influence is 
not typically eliminated even if it is reduced (see also Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001; Harris, 
1978; Harris, Teske, & Ginns, 1975). Based on the literature reviewed, it was therefore 
hypothesized that undermining the credibility of a doctored photo would similarly reduce, but 
not entirely eliminate, its effects on people’s beliefs. In the present research, Sacchi et al.’s 
(2007) doctored-photo methodology was used to test this hypothesis. 
Experiment 1 
One straightforward way to undermine the credibility of doctored images is to overtly 
identify them as fakes. For instance, women in one study who were exposed to digitally-
idealized photos of fashion models reported greater body satisfaction when those photos were 
explicitly labelled as altered (Slater, Tiggemann, Firth, & Hawkins, 2012). The purpose of 
Experiment 1 was to search for analogous effects in the domain of beliefs about public events, 
by adding a disclaimer to the doctored photo seen by some subjects.  
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Method 
Subjects and Design. A total of 203 UK-resident adults (76.8% females) aged 18-61 
(M= 24.8, SD= 8.8) completed the study either online (n= 140) or on paper (n= 63) without 
compensation. In this and the subsequent studies, sample sizes were based solely on the 
number of people who took part within predetermined testing periods. Each subject was 
randomly assigned to either the Genuine (n= 67), Doctored (n= 65) or Doctored-disclaimer 
(n= 71) photo condition, and informed that the study was about ‘memory for public events’.1 
Materials and Procedure. 
Photos. A recent and prominent target event was chosen for this study, namely the 
torch relay that preceded the London 2012 Olympic Games (the data were collected during 
2013). The chosen target photo, obtained from the Internet, was in color and depicted a relay-
runner carrying the Olympic torch past cheering crowds (the Genuine photo). For the 
Doctored condition, a professional graphic artist manipulated this photo by adding anti-
Olympic placards amongst the crowd, adding numerous riot police officers, and changing the 
runner’s face to appear worried rather than jubilant. For the Doctored-disclaimer condition, a 
prominent text-box was added to the upper-left corner of the doctored photo, stating ‘Note: 
This image has been Photoshopped’.2 
Questionnaire. Subjects completed the questionnaire at their own pace. After 
consenting to participate and providing demographic details, subjects were shown one of the 
three photos and were asked to write in their own words which event they thought the photo 
portrayed. The purpose of this question was merely to ensure that subjects paid attention to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The questions and the visual layout of the ‘pages’ were identical across presentation formats (online vs. paper). 
Mann-Whitney tests revealed no significant differences between presentation formats for any target question 
with the exception of the Arrests question, where online subjects made significantly higher estimates than those 
who completed paper-based surveys. The proportions of subjects who completed the study in paper format was 
closely matched across experimental conditions (Genuine = 33%; Doctored = 29%; Doctored-Disclaimer = 31%; 
χ2= 0.20, p= .91), therefore in all analyses, the data are collapsed across presentation formats. 
2 For copyright compliance reasons, the photographs used in these experiments cannot be reproduced here; 
however they can be obtained from the author on request. 
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the content of the photograph, regardless of whether or not they identified the event correctly 
(95.6% mentioned the Olympics and/or the torch or torch relay). On the subsequent page, the 
same image was shown again beneath the caption ‘The event depicted in this photo is the 
2012 Olympic torch relay.’ Subjects rated how well they remembered the event (1= not at all, 
5= very well). 
On the next page, the photo was removed and subjects were instructed to answer the 
remaining questions based solely on their memory of the event. After one filler question 
regarding the number of people who watched the torch relay, they answered the target 
questions. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Target questions. All the verbatim target questions and scale anchors are listed in 
Table 1. Like Sacchi et al. (2007), we asked questions about details of the event itself, plus 
additional questions about subjects’ attitudes and behavioural intentions. The choice of target 
questions was thematically informed by, but not identical to, the questions used by Sacchi et 
al. Subjects were first asked questions about the event itself, beginning by estimating the 
proportion of spectators at the event who were protesters rather than supporters. Like in 
Sacchi et al. (2007), this was the critical target question for which significant effects of 
doctored photos were predicted. All additional questions were selected based on exploratory 
rather than a priori theoretical reasons, and continued with estimates of the number of arrests 
made, and the number of injuries (note that among those who completed the survey in paper 
format, up to three data points were missing per condition for these three variables; see Table 
S1 in supplemental materials). Subjects also rated on 5-point scales how violent the protesters 
were, how much damage was caused to property, how successful the police were in 
controlling the crowds, and whether the relay went as smoothly as expected. Subjects were 
next asked questions about their future intentions: they rated on 5-point scales how likely 
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they would be to attend a similar event in the future if it occurred, and the likelihood they 
would protest a similar event if it occurred. Before being debriefed, subjects were invited to 
write any comments they had about the study. 
Results 
Overall, subjects reported remembering the Olympic torch relay quite well (M = 3.73 
out of 5, SD = 1.23). Looking to the main research question, the data differed substantially 
from normal distributions for most target variables, and transforming the data did not resolve 
this issue. Nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests are therefore reported for each of the five 
dependent variables that met the assumption of homogeneity of variances, as assessed via a 
nonparametric Levene’s test (Nordstokke & Zumbo, 2010). For the remaining four dependent 
variables that did not meet this assumption, Mood’s median χ2 test was instead calculated. As 
the middle columns of Table 2 show, these analyses revealed significant differences between 
conditions for three of the nine target questions. In particular on the critical question, subjects’ 
estimates of the proportion of spectators who were protesters differed significantly across 
conditions, as did their ratings of how smoothly the event went, and of the police’s success in 
controlling the crowds. Follow-up pairwise Dunn tests or Mood’s median χ2 test (as 
appropriate) for these three variables show that responses in the Genuine condition differed 
significantly from those in the Doctored condition (all ps< .05; see rightmost columns of 
Table 2), but also from those in the Doctored-disclaimer condition (all ps< .05). Responses 
did not differ between the Doctored and Doctored-disclaimer conditions for any of these 
variables (all ps> .10). Responses did not differ significantly across conditions for any of the 
other target questions.3 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In this and the subsequent experiments, follow-up analyses were also conducted that excluded those subjects 
who rated their recollection of the target events as ‘1’ (not at all). During revision of this paper, these analyses 
were removed in favor of the mini-metaanalytic approach outlined below. !
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Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that doctored photos influenced some of the 
beliefs held by subjects about the torch relay, and that a disclaimer was insufficient to negate 
this effect. This finding might imply that the credibility of a doctored photo is not a 
prerequisite for its capacity to distort beliefs. However, even though the photos in the 
Doctored-disclaimer condition were explicitly identified as doctored, it is plausible that some 
subjects in that condition still treated them as authentic. For example, they may not have 
noticed the disclaimer. In a small pilot study, 32 volunteers viewed the same materials as the 
online Doctored-disclaimer subjects from Experiment 1, but rather than receiving the target 
questions after viewing the photo for the second time, they were instead asked to report what 
the disclaimer in the corner of the photo has said. In total, 27 of the volunteers (84%) were 
able to repeat the gist, which supports the idea that most subjects in Experiment 1, but 
perhaps not all, would have noticed the disclaimer.  
Yet even if they did notice the disclaimer, subjects may still have not understood the 
word ‘Photoshopped’, or may have presumed that details irrelevant to the authenticity of the 
image had been manipulated, such as the coloring. To counter these interpretations and to 
develop these findings further, in Experiment 2 the credibility of doctored photos was 
undermined in a different way – by making the quality of the manipulation deliberately 
obvious. This variation meant that subjects would be highly likely to know that aspects of the 
doctored photo were fake. They might not notice all of the manipulations, of course, but 
should nevertheless be clear that the image is not entirely authentic. This time, subjects also 
saw photos of a more discrete target event (i.e., an event that occurred on one single day), 
namely the 2011 Royal Wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton. 
Method 
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Subjects and Design. A total of 174 UK-resident adults (69.0% females) aged 18-72 
(M= 27.8, SD= 11.8) participated online during 2013 without compensation. Each subject 
was randomly assigned to either the Genuine (n= 57), Well-doctored (n= 58) or Badly-
doctored (n= 59) photo condition, and they were told that the study was about memory for 
public events. 
Materials and Procedure. 
Photos. A color photo was obtained from the Internet, depicting the Royal couple 
driving alongside cheering crowds on their wedding day (the Genuine photo). A graphic artist 
created two doctored versions of this photo, adding anti-monarchy protesters holding placards, 
as well as extra police officers on foot, horseback, and motorcycle. For the Well-doctored 
condition, great effort was invested in making this manipulation convincing. For the Badly-
doctored condition, the manipulation involved the same additions but was deliberately 
unconvincing – objects were the wrong size, wrong color, and/or wrong proportions, some 
were coarsely pixelated, the police motorcycle was missing its front wheel, and so forth. 
As a manipulation check, 60 volunteers were shown five doctored filler photos 
collected from the Internet (including, of course, one of levitating Chinese government 
officials), followed randomly by a target photo: either the Genuine, Well-doctored, or Badly-
doctored photo of the Royal Wedding. Subjects were told that all six photos had been 
doctored, and they rated the convincingness of each (1= not at all convincing; 7= very 
convincing). Their ratings of the target photo differed by condition, F(2, 57)= 17.25, p< .001; 
post-hoc comparisons showed that the Well-doctored photo (M= 4.55, SD= 1.99) was indeed 
more convincing than the Badly-doctored photo (M= 2.55, SD= 1.67, p< .01), although not as 
convincing as the Genuine photo (M= 5.90, SD= 1.77, p= .03). 
Questionnaire. Similarly to Experiment 1, subjects in the main part of Experiment 2 
were first shown one of the three photos and asked which event they thought the photo 
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portrayed (93.7% mentioned the Royal Wedding, though most of the remaining 6.3% also 
gave responses that indicated clear engagement with the photo, e.g., “Anti monarchy protest” 
or naming the wrong members of the royal family). They were not told anything about the 
authenticity of the photo. On the subsequent page, the same image was re-shown beneath the 
caption ‘The event depicted in this photo is the 2011 Royal Wedding of Prince William and 
Kate Middleton’. The remaining procedure mirrored Experiment 1 except for some different 
target questions; no filler questions were included. 
Target questions. The verbatim target questions and scale anchors are listed in Table 1, 
and were again thematically informed by, but not identical to, the questions used by Sacchi et 
al. (2007). Like Experiment 1, these began with questions about the event itself. Subjects first 
answered the critical question, estimating the proportion of spectators at the event who were 
protesters rather than supporters. They then estimated the number of arrests made, and the 
number of extra police on duty, and they rated on a 5-point scale how violent the protesters 
were. Next they were asked questions about attitudes – they rated on 5-point scales how 
supportive both they and the British public were of the wedding, and how positive both they 
and the British public thought the event was. Subjects then answered questions about their 
intentions: they rated on 5-point scales how likely they would be to attend a similar event in 
the future if it occurred, and the likelihood that they would protest a similar event if it 
occurred. Before being debriefed, subjects were invited to add comments about the study. 
Results 
Overall, subjects reported remembering the Royal Wedding quite well (M = 3.24 out 
of 5, SD = 1.20). Due to non-normal data distributions, Kruskal-Wallis tests were again 
conducted for each dependent variable, with the exception of the ‘Protest in future’ variable, 
which did not meet the assumption of homogeneity of variances, and for which Mood’s 
median χ2 test was instead conducted. As the middle part of Table 3 shows, there were 
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significant differences across conditions for three of the ten target questions. As in 
Experiment 1, subjects’ estimates of the proportion of spectators who were protesters differed 
substantially across conditions. So too did their estimates of the number of arrests made, and 
their ratings of how supportive the British public were of the Royal Wedding. Follow-up 
pairwise Dunn tests for these three variables showed that responses in the Genuine condition 
differed significantly from those in the Well-doctored condition (ps< .04; see rightmost 
columns of Table 3), with the exception of the number of arrests, which was not significant, 
p= .10. The responses in the Genuine condition also differed significantly from those in the 
Badly-doctored condition for all three of these variables (all ps< .01), but the Well-doctored 
and Badly-doctored conditions did not differ significantly for any of the three (ps> .34). 
Responses did not differ significantly across conditions for any of the other target questions. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Experiment 3 
 The findings of Experiment 2 give us greater confidence that subjects were influenced 
even by photos that they knew were not wholly authentic. Experiment 3 set out to replicate 
these findings, but with some additional measures inspired by Laney et al.’s (2008) Red 
Herring Technique, to help rule out the possibility that the results could have been driven by 
demand effects – important because neither Experiment 1 nor 2 included systematic checks 
on subjects’ suspicion. In the Red Herring Technique, subjects are given a false cover story 
about the experiment’s purpose just like in Experiments 1 and 2. But in addition, several ‘foil’ 
questions are inserted into the study procedure, designed to lead subjects to suspect that the 
experiment is actually about some other, equally false, topic. These red herrings reduce the 
chance that subjects who are suspicious about the experiment’s intent will alight on the actual 
hypothesis. In Experiment 3 then, subjects were informed that the study was about ‘attitudes 
towards monarchy and patriotism,’ but throughout the questionnaire they answered several 
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questions that could lead them to think the study was really about public confidence in 
policing and security. To measure the effectiveness of this ploy, at the end of the study 
subjects were asked what they believed the aim of the experiment to be. 
Method 
Subjects and design. A total of 217 UK-resident adults (46.1% females) aged 18-84 
(M= 31.3, SD= 16.6) participated online during 2014 without compensation. Each was 
randomly assigned to either the Genuine (n= 74), Well-doctored (n= 79) or Badly-doctored 
(n= 64) photo condition. 
Materials and Procedure. 
Photos. The photos used in this study were identical to those used in Experiment 2, 
except for the badly-doctored photo. It was clear from the manipulation check in Experiment 
2 that people already found the badly-doctored unbelievable; nevertheless it seemed there 
was some room to make this photo even less believable and thus to strengthen the credibility 
manipulation further. Efforts were therefore taken to this end; specifically, several of the false 
details that had been digitally added to this photo were given colored border-edging that 
mismatched their surrounding. This manipulation gave the distinct impression that these 
details had been poorly ‘cut out’ from another image. Using the same manipulation check as 
in Experiment 2, 60 new volunteers rated the convincingness of six doctored photos, 
including one of the three target photos. Their ratings of the target photo differed by 
condition, F(2, 57)= 69.14, p< .001; post-hoc comparisons showed that the Well-doctored 
photo (M= 5.90, SD= 1.25) was far more convincing than the Badly-doctored photo (M= 2.10, 
SD= 1.25, p< .001), and almost as convincing as the Genuine photo (M= 6.25, SD= 1.21, 
p= .38). 
Questionnaire. Subjects completed the same questionnaire as in Experiment 2, except 
for four changes. The first was that seven filler questions were intermixed amongst the target 
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questions, two of which related to the stated cover story of the study (i.e., about patriotism) 
and five formed the ‘red herring’ (about policing). For example, subjects were asked “To 
what extent would you say that you are ‘proud to be British’?” and “How much authority in 
general do you believe the police have in the UK?”. The second minor change was that the 
target question about how many extra police were on call during the Royal Wedding was 
removed, because the variability of the data from Experiment 2 indicated that people 
struggled to estimate this number, and it was replaced with a question about police control, 
like in Experiment 1. Third, all questions using Likert scale responses used 7-point, rather 
than 5-point scales, to permit greater sensitivity in subjects’ responses. The fourth change 
was that before being debriefed, subjects were required to write in their own words what they 
believed the aim of the study to be.  
Results 
 Guessing the study’s aims. Before analyzing the main data, subjects’ ideas about the 
study’s aims were first inspected. A research assistant coded each of these, blind to condition, 
as either (1) consistent with the stated cover story about monarchy and patriotism; (2) 
consistent with the red herring, mentioning details about policing and/or security (either alone, 
or alongside references to monarchy and patriotism); (3) consistent with the true aim of the 
study, mentioning the suggestiveness of (doctored) images; or (4) some other unrelated idea.  
The majority of subjects (53.4%) were apparently unsuspicious, suggesting study 
aims that were consistent with the cover story they received. A further 36.4% were coded as 
‘red herring’ responses, which suggests that this ploy was successful. Indeed, some of these 
subjects’ responses confirm that they had been eager to identify ulterior aims of the study; for 
example one wrote “[A psychology student] once told me they are outright liars in the titles 
of their studies otherwise it affects their outcome. I'd therefore guess that the study is about 
public opinions towards police and their methods.” Only four subjects appeared to have a 
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sense of the true purpose of the study, although a fifth subject who might have been 
suspicious (“Use of pictures/media to influence public patriotism”) was added to this 
category, to be conservative (2.3%). The remaining 7.8% of subjects made unrelated guesses 
or indicated that they had no idea. 
In short, these data indicate that awareness of the study’s aims likely played a very 
minimal role in the present findings. The five subjects who were coded as correctly guessing 
the study’s aims were removed from analyses; these analyses are therefore based on the 
remaining 212 subjects, of whom 94.3% mentioned the royal wedding when asked which 
event the photo portrayed (like in Experiment 2, most of the remainder also gave responses 
that indicated clear engagement with the photo). These subjects said that they recalled the 
wedding quite well (M = 4.70 out of 7, SD = 1.89). 
Main analysis. Kruskal-Wallis tests were again conducted for each dependent 
variable except for the ‘Protest in future’ variable, which did not meet the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances, and for which Mood’s median χ2 test was instead conducted. As 
the middle part of Table 4 shows, there were significant differences for two of the nine target 
questions, including the critical question. Subjects’ estimates of the proportion of spectators 
who were protesters differed across conditions, as in both previous experiments, and their 
estimates of the number of arrests made also differed. Follow-up pairwise Dunn tests showed 
that for both of these variables, estimates in the Genuine condition were greater than those in 
the Well-doctored condition (both ps< .05; see rightmost columns of Table 4) and the Badly-
doctored condition (ps< .03). Responses did not differ between the Well-doctored and Badly-
doctored conditions for either variable (ps> .17). No other statistically significant differences 
emerged for any other target question.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Effect size estimation 
Running Head: DOCTORED PHOTOS AND CREDIBILITY 17 
Of the 14 different target questions used across Experiments 1-3, ten were measured 
in more than one experiment, and five (including the critical question) were measured in all 
three experiments. It is therefore useful to statistically combine data across experiments, to 
gain more precise estimates of the effects of the believable and unbelievable fake photos on 
people’s beliefs, rather than relying solely on null hypothesis significance testing (Cumming, 
2012). The so-called ‘mini meta-analysis’ is an excellent tool for this task (Goh, Hall, & 
Rosenthal, 2016). 
Method 
 Using the procedure outlined by Ruscio (2008), the effect-size measure A was 
calculated for each target variable measured in each of Experiments 1 to 3, for each of the 
three pairwise contrasts of experimental conditions. This effect size measure, as Ruscio has 
demonstrated, is highly robust to violations of parametric assumptions, and can be easily 
converted to a standardized measure dA using the procedure described by Li (2016). These dA 
measures were therefore calculated in order to permit the straightforward combination of 
effect sizes across experiments. Estimates of dA are reported in full in Table S1 in the online 
supplementary materials, and can be interpreted as standardized mean differences equivalent 
to Cohen’s d. 
For the ten variables that were measured in multiple experiments, dA values were 
combined across experiments via a series of random effects mini meta-analyses. For the 
purposes of these analyses, the ‘Doctored’ condition of Experiment 1 and the ‘Well-doctored’ 
conditions of Experiments 2 and 3 were treated as equivalent, and represent the Believable 
fake conditions. Likewise, the ‘Doctored-disclaimer’ condition of Experiment 1 and the 
‘Badly-doctored’ conditions of Experiments 2 and 3 were treated as equivalent, and represent 
the Unbelievable fake conditions. These analyses were conducted both using 95% confidence 
intervals and, to account for the inflated likelihood of Type I errors, using more conservative 
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99.9% confidence intervals (calculated using ESCI; Cumming, 2012). For the four variables 
measured in only one experiment, confidence intervals for dA were again calculated, but those 
results are not discussed further. 
Results 
The results of these analyses are reported in Table 5, and three specific findings 
warrant particular attention. First, and most importantly, combining data across the three 
experiments revealed that subjects’ estimates of the prevalence of protesters were 
significantly inflated both by believable and unbelievable fake photos. Indeed, both kinds of 
photo had medium-sized effects on these prevalence estimates, relative to genuine photos. 
Although unbelievable fakes appeared to have a somewhat smaller influence on these 
estimates than did believable fakes, the 95% confidence interval for this difference 
marginally included zero. All of these conclusions held even after reducing the likelihood of 
Type I error by using 99.9% confidence intervals. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 Second, across the three experiments, subjects’ estimates of the number of arrests 
were also significantly boosted both by believable and unbelievable fakes (relative to genuine 
photos), and these effects were in the order of small-to-medium. As Table 5 shows, the 
significant effect of unbelievable fakes held even after reducing the likelihood of Type I error, 
but in this more conservative analysis the 99.9% confidence interval for the effect of 
believable fakes marginally included zero. 
 Third, across the three experiments, believable fakes led subjects to estimate greater 
levels of violence at the public events; this meta-analytic effect was in the order of small-to-
medium. However, this effect did not remain statistically significant after reducing the 
likelihood of Type I error. In both analyses, the effect of unbelievable photos did not differ 
significantly either from the effect of genuine photos, or of believable photos. 
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 As Table 5 shows, there were no significant differences between conditions for any of 
the other seven variables that were measured in multiple experiments. In sum, when the data 
were combined across experiments, there was clear evidence that both believable and 
unbelievable fake photos influenced subjects’ beliefs about the critical question, namely the 
prevalence of protesters at the target events. There was also some evidence that other 
elements of people’s beliefs about these events were influenced similarly, but no strong 
evidence that the effects of doctored photos were reliably reduced by undermining their 
credibility. 
General Discussion 
 These data represent the latest empirical demonstration of the power of fabricated 
images to alter people’s beliefs about public events (Frenda et al., 2013; Sacchi et al., 2007). 
In three experiments, doctored photographs shaped certain beliefs about two relatively recent 
events of particular salience to the British public – the 2012 Olympic Torch relay, and the 
2011 Royal Wedding. Most prominently, there were consistent effects on the critical target 
question: in all three studies, the digital forgeries led subjects to believe that the prevalence of 
protesters among the spectators at these events was greater. What is more striking is that the 
initial hypothesis—that undermining source credibility would reduce but not eliminate the 
effects on doctored photos—was only partially supported. The effects were certainly not 
eliminated, but in fact, they were not reliably reduced either. In other words, this medium-
sized effect occurred even when the photo’s inauthenticity was overt, either due to an explicit 
written disclaimer, or because the digital manipulation was poor. Such findings support the 
conclusion that mechanisms aside from credibility can lend influence to doctored images 
even when their credibility is low. This point will be discussed shortly. 
Alongside the critical target question, the believable and unbelievable doctored photos 
also seemed to have somewhat weaker effects on responses to other target questions. Notably, 
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there was some evidence that both kind of doctored photos led subjects to estimate that 
significantly more people were arrested at the target events. Believable fakes also increased 
subjects’ estimates of violence, although it is difficult to interpret whether undermining the 
credibility of these photos did diminish this effect, or indeed whether it could be attributed to 
Type I error due to the large number of variables measured. Likewise, other significant 
effects of believable and unbelievable doctored photos emerged within the individual studies, 
but the replicability and robustness of those individual findings is unclear.  
In general, statistically significant effects were rather rarer than one might expect 
based on Sacchi et al.’s (2007) research, in which statistically significant effects of doctored 
photos emerged from 16 of 27 inferential tests of similar target questions across two 
experiments. Nevertheless, the analyses here support the conclusion that at least some effects 
of believable and unbelievable doctored photos were robust, and not easily attributed to the 
inflated likelihood of Type I errors. The fact that the effects were strongest for the critical 
question—estimates of the prevalence of protesters—is likely related to the fact that the 
doctored photos themselves depicted protesters; these false beliefs were therefore at least 
partly consistent with the literal content of the photos, whereas any effects on other target 
questions (e.g., to believe that there was violence) would require a larger leap of inference. 
The influence of unbelievable doctored photos might seem counterintuitive, but it is 
worth noting that even in Frenda et al.’s (2013) research, the doctored photos did not always 
constitute credible proof of the suggestions. For instance, their photo might seem to prove 
that George W. Bush spent time with the baseball star, yet it contained no evidence that this 
happened specifically during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. That particular element of 
the suggestion was provided in an accompanying written caption, which transformed an 
otherwise innocuous doctored photo into one that could be politically toxic. In short, that 
particular doctored photo might well have led people—especially Liberals—to believe they 
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recalled the fictional Bush story, but this was not because the photo contained credible proof 
of the politically damaging details. 
If credibility is not wholly responsible for the effects of doctored photos, then what 
other mechanisms might play a role? In some cases, people accept suggestions from 
unbelievable sources because, after a sufficient delay, they continue to remember the 
misinformation but forget the cues concerning low source credibility (Underwood & Pezdek, 
1998). This ‘sleeper effect’ seems an unlikely explanation here, given that subjects in these 
studies—like Sacchi et al.’s (2007) and Frenda et al.’s (2013) subjects—reported their beliefs 
only moments after seeing the doctored photos. It also seems unlikely that demand effects 
can explain these findings. First, like in Sacchi et al. (2007), several subjects in Experiments 
1 and 2 made spontaneous comments suggesting they were not aware of having been misled. 
For example, one wrote “Strange that people came to protest, being violent. Unsure of the 
study aims”. Second, and more powerfully, in Experiment 3 subjects were formally prompted 
to report their ideas about the study’s aims, and a red herring was used to disguise the true 
aims. In these circumstances, still very few subjects guessed correctly, and even after 
excluding those guessers some effects of both well-doctored and badly-doctored photos still 
obtained.  
At least two other mechanisms are conceivable, although further studies would be 
necessary to test these mechanisms directly. First, these findings are consistent with the idea 
that photos provide a degree of familiarity to suggestions, even when they offer no probative 
evidence (Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009; Newman et al., 2012; Strange et al., 2011). 
According to this explanation, simply seeing images of protesters and police—irrespective of 
how convincingly they were embedded into the scene—could have led subjects to process 
thoughts about aggression and unrest more fluently, with this fluency being misattributed to 
familiarity and prior experience (Brown & Marsh, 2009; Fazio et al., 2015; Jacoby et al., 
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1989; Winkielman, Reber, Schwarz, & Fazendeiro, 2003). This explanation fits neatly with 
the finding that digitally adding police officers into photos of safe-looking environments can 
lead those environments to be judged as less safe (van de Veer, de Lange, van der Haar, & 
Karremans, 2012).  
A second, but not mutually exclusive possibility is that the false details in the 
doctored photos prompted subjects to retrieve mental images of protests and violence at other 
events, in real-life or on television. Indeed, media speculation about the possibility of protests 
preceded both the Olympic torch relay and the Royal Wedding—although both events in 
reality occurred with minimal disruption (Gibson & Walker, 2012; Malik, 2011)—and 
subjects might have even imagined these hypothetical protests at the time of the media 
coverage. We know that photos can lead people to elaborate on the information they receive, 
and to then believe they actually saw or heard those elaborated details (e.g., Garry, Strange, 
Bernstein, & Kinzett, 2007; Henkel, 2012). Therefore, the images of unrest in the convincing 
and unconvincing doctored photos could have encouraged subjects to retrieve relevant mental 
imagery, which they might in turn have misattributed to their recollections of the target 
events via a feature importation mechanism (Henkel & Carbuto, 2008; Johnson, Hashtroudi, 
& Lindsay, 1993; Lyle & Johnson, 2006). Whether these, or other mechanisms are 
responsible for the effects we have observed, an important finding is that the effects obtained 
even though the low credibility of the source should have given subjects a strong steer to be 
vigilant to potential influence. 
 The findings of these studies have clear implications for the popular media, wherein 
digital fakes are published regularly and there is currently great interest in people’s ability to 
detect and reject so-called ‘fake news’. In particular, it is interesting to consider the influence 
that fake images might have when published in low-credibility media sources, and are 
therefore not expected to be taken seriously (see Kelly & Nace, 1994). In future studies it 
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would be valuable to examine whether the distortive power of doctored photos grows as time 
elapses after exposure, and as any doubts about source credibility are gradually replaced with 
a hazy sense of familiarity (Brown & Marsh, 2009; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010; 
Skurnik, Yoon, Schwarz, & Park, 2005). A further question not addressed here is to what 
extent people’s general proclivity to trust photos—relative to written or spoken suggestions—
plays a role in allowing even blatantly false suggestions to influence people’s beliefs. For 
example, a habitual tendency to trust photos might mean people require more time to process 
source credibility cues, time during which rapid mechanisms such as familiarity and fluency 
could be influencing people’s beliefs. Future research should examine the plausibility of this 
speculative account. Finally, given the increasing focus on the behavioral consequences of 
false beliefs, future studies might explore whether doctored images—believable ones, or 
blatant ones—ever lead people to change their behavior (Bernstein, Scoboria, & Arnold, 
2015; Clifasefi, Bernstein, Mantonakis, & Loftus, 2013). An obvious forgery, it seems, could 
be influential just like a compelling forgery – something that might give pause for thought to 
those who mocked the photo of levitating Chinese officials.  
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Table 1. Verbatim wording of target questions and scale anchors in Experiments 1-3. 
Question Experi
ment 
Wording 
Protesters 1, 2, 3 Of those people who lined the streets of [the UK / London] to attend the [Olympic torch relay / Royal Wedding], 
how many per one thousand would you estimate were there to protest rather than to support? 
Arrests 1, 2, 3 Of those people who lined the streets of [the UK / London] to attend the [Olympic torch relay / Royal Wedding], 
how many in total would you estimate were arrested at the scene? 
Injuries 1 Of those people who lined the streets of the UK to attend the Olympic torch relay, how many in total would you 
estimate were injured at the scene? 
Police officers 2 Approximately how many extra police officers were on call in Central London on the day of the event to ensure a 
safe and secure environment? 
Violence 1, 2, 3 How violent were those people who protested on the streets at the [Olympic torch relay / Royal Wedding]? [Not 
at all violent; Very violent] 
Damage 1 How much damage to local property do you think was caused by spectators at the Olympic torch relay? [Very 
little damage; A very great deal of damage] 
Smoothly 1 Do you think that the overall Olympic torch relay went as smoothly as expected? [Not at all smoothly; Very 
smoothly] 
Police control 1, 3 How would you rate the police's success in controlling the [Olympic torch relay crowds across the country / 
Royal Wedding crowds]? [Highly unsuccessful; Highly successful] 
Supportive-self 2, 3 How supportive were you personally of the Royal Wedding? [Not at all supportive; Very supportive] 
Supportive-public 2, 3 How supportive were the British Public of the Royal Wedding? [Not at all supportive; Very supportive] 
Positive-self 2, 3 How positive or negative did you personally feel the Royal Wedding was? [Very negative; Very positive] 
Positive-public 2, 3 How positive or negative do you think the British Public in general felt the Royal Wedding was? [Very negative; 
Very positive] 
Attend in future 1, 2, 3 How likely are you to want to attend an event similar to the [Olympic torch relay / Royal Wedding] if it were to 
happen in the UK again in future? [Very unlikely; Very likely] 
Protest in future 1, 2, 3 How likely are you to protest an event similar to the [Olympic torch relay / Royal Wedding] if it were to happen 
in the UK again in future? [Very unlikely; Very likely] 
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Table 2. Responses to target questions in Experiment 1. The left side of the table reports median responses for each condition, alongside means 
and standard deviations (in parentheses) for illustrative purposes. The right side of the table reports nonparametric omnibus tests and, where 
these tests are statistically significant, pairwise contrasts of conditions. 
Question Condition Omnibus 
test 
 Test of pairwise contrasts 
    Kruskal-
Wallis χ2 
Dunn z 
 Genuine (A) Doctored (B) Doctored- 
disclaimer (C) 
 (B) vs. (A) (C) vs. (A) (C) vs. (B) 
Protesters (# per 
1000) 
Mdn = 5 
M = 33.00 (125.32) 
Mdn = 35 
M = 67.58 (101.38) 
Mdn = 10 
M = 59.07 (103.63) 
18.90*** 
η2 = .09 
4.29*** 2.78* -1.60 
Arrests (#) Mdn = 10 
M = 58.49 (143.12) 
Mdn = 20 
M = 115.13 (225.03) 
Mdn = 20 
M = 114.49 (296.10) 
4.99 
η2 = .02 
   
Violence (1-5) Mdn = 2 
M = 1.85 (0.84) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.08 (0.78) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.01 (0.90) 
3.05 
η2 = .02 
   
Damage (1-5) Mdn = 2 
M = 1.94 (0.97) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.02 (0.86) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 1.99 (0.95) 
0.56 
η2 = .00 
   
Police control 
(1-5) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 4.19 (0.63) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.85 (0.80) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.92 (0.73) 
7.99* 
η2 = .04 
-2.63** -2.22* 0.47 
    Mood’s 
Median 
test χ2 
Mood’s Median test χ2 
 Genuine (A) Doctored (B) Doctored- 
disclaimer (C) 
 (B) vs. (A) (C) vs. (A) (C) vs. (B) 
Injuries (#) Mdn = 20 
M = 169.12 (648.98) 
Mdn = 20 
M = 42.52 (57.04) 
Mdn = 20 
M = 113.96 (293.45) 
1.63  
V = .09 
   
Smoothly (1-5) Mdn = 4 
M = 4.00 (0.76) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.54 (0.87) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.66 (0.77) 
6.96* 
V = .19 
-4.73* -4.62* 0.01 
Attend in future 
(1-5) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.63 (1.22) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.40 (1.47) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.70 (1.13) 
0.52 
V = .05 
   
Protest in future 
(1-5) 
Mdn = 1 
M = 1.13 (0.42) 
Mdn = 1 
M = 1.34 (0.85) 
Mdn= 1 
M = 1.28 (0.73) 
2.52 
V = .11 
   
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p< .001  
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Table 3. Responses to target questions in Experiment 2. The left side of the table reports median responses for each condition, alongside means 
and standard deviations (in parentheses) for illustrative purposes. The right side of the table reports nonparametric omnibus tests and, where 
these tests are statistically significant, pairwise contrasts of conditions. 
Question Condition Kruskal-
Wallis χ2 
Dunn z 
 
 Genuine (A) Well-doctored (B) Badly-doctored (C)  (B) vs. (A) (C) vs. (A) (C) vs. (B) 
Protesters (# per 
1000) 
Mdn = 3 
M = 17.35 (35.96) 
Mdn = 11 
M = 62.03 (142.02) 
Mdn =10  
M = 45.76 (112.39) 
14.56***  
η2 = .08 
3.45*** 3.16** -0.31 
Arrests (#) Mdn = 20  
M = 155.75 (670.66) 
Mdn = 35 
M = 213.02 (680.73) 
Mdn = 50 
M = 213.47 (408.65) 
6.77*  
η2 = .04 
1.63 2.57* 0.94 
Police officers 
(#) 
Mdn = 2000 
M = 16828.07 
(71329.06) 
Mdn = 2000 
M = 8870.00 
(19776.87) 
Mdn = 2000  
M = 11606.05 
(31507.42) 
0.14  
η2 = .00 
   
Violence  (1-5) Mdn = 2 
M = 1.81 (0.92) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.09 (0.92) 
Mdn = 2  
M = 2.05 (0.82) 
4.56  
η2 = .03 
   
Supportive-
public (1-5) 
Mdn = 5  
M = 4.58 (0.60) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 4.33 (0.69) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 4.29 (0.59) 
8.07*  
η2 = .05 
-2.11* -2.71** -0.60 
Supportive-you 
(1-5) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.81 (1.20) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.78 (1.22) 
Mdn = 3 
M = 3.59 (1.05) 
2.21  
η2 = .01 
   
Positive-public 
(1-5) 
Mdn = 5 
M = 4.51 (0.66) 
Mdn = 4  
M = 4.36 (0.61) 
Mdn = 4  
M = 4.24 (0.68) 
3.87  
η2 = .02 
   
Positive-you (1-
5) 
Mdn = 4  
M = 4.19 (0.95) 
Mdn = 4  
M = 4.12 (0.88) 
Mdn = 4  
M = 3.92 (0.90) 
5.56  
η2 = .03 
   
Attend in future 
(1-5) 
Mdn = 2  
M = 2.54 (1.36) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.31 (1.17) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.29 (1.38) 
1.31  
η2 = .00 
   
    Mood’s 
Median 
test χ2 
 
 Genuine (A) Doctored (B) Doctored- 
disclaimer (C) 
    
Protest in future 
(1-5) 
Mdn = 1 
M = 1.16 (0.62) 
Mdn = 1 
M = 1.14 (0.40) 
Mdn = 1 
M = 1.22 (0.64) 
4.52 
V = .16 
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p< .001
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Table 4. Responses to target questions in Experiment 3. The left side of the table reports median responses for each condition, alongside means 
and standard deviations (in parentheses) for illustrative purposes. The right side of the table reports nonparametric omnibus tests and, where 
these tests are statistically significant, pairwise contrasts of conditions. 
Question Condition Kruskal-
Wallis χ2 
Dunn z 
 
 Genuine (A) Well-doctored (B) Badly-doctored (C)  (B) vs. (A) (C) vs. (A) (C) vs. (B) 
Protesters (# per 
1000) 
Mdn = 10 
M = 28.50 (105.58) 
Mdn = 20 
M = 77.97 (157.92) 
Mdn = 10  
M = 59.79 (141.55) 
14.23***  
η2 = .07 
3.74*** 2.21* -1.34 
Arrests (#) Mdn = 10 
M = 34.99 (76.51) 
Mdn = 15.5 
M = 44.64 (75.28) 
Mdn = 20  
M = 70.44 (253.99) 
6.30* 
η2 = .03 
2.03* 2.27* 0.34 
Violence (1-7) Mdn = 2 
M = 2.31 (1.07) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.64 (1.24) 
Mdn = 2 
M = 2.26 (0.99) 
3.73  
η2 = .02 
   
Police control 
(1-7) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.62 (1.19) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.64 (1.19) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.48 (1.28) 
0.53 
η2 = .00 
   
Supportive-
public (1-7) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.72 (1.09) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.84 (0.99) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.89 (1.04) 
1.11 
η2 = .00 
   
Supportive-you 
(1-7) 
Mdn = 5 
M = 5.14 (1.72) 
Mdn = 5.5 
M = 4.91 (2.10) 
Mdn = 5  
M = 5.08 (1.93) 
0.18 
η2 = .00 
   
Positive-public 
(1-7) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.61 (1.08) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.79 (1.02) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.76 (1.10) 
1.31 
η2 = .00 
   
Positive-you (1-
7) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.36 (1.68) 
Mdn = 6  
M = 5.57 (1.74) 
Mdn = 6 
M = 5.47 (1.52) 
1.12 
η2 = .00 
   
Attend in future 
(1-7) 
Mdn = 3 
M = 3.23 (2.06) 
Mdn = 3  
M = 3.24 (1.91) 
Mdn = 4 
M = 3.63 (2.04) 
1.72 
η2 = .00 
   
    Mood’s 
Median 
test χ2 
 
 Genuine (A) Doctored (B) Doctored- 
disclaimer (C) 
    
Protest in future 
(1-7) 
Mdn = 1 
M = 1.42 (1.06) 
Mdn = 1 
M = 1.14 (0.63) 
Mdn = 1  
M = 1.29 (0.93) 
5.11 
V = .16 
* p< .05, *** p< .001  
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Table 5. Overall effect size dA estimates for each target question across experiments. Where a target question was asked in more than one 
experiment, effect sized estimates are based on random-effects mini meta-analyses. Figures in the first set of square brackets in each cell 
represent 95% confidence intervals; figures in the second set of square brackets in each cell represent 99.9% confidence intervals. 
 
Question Experiments Estimate of effect size dA for pairwise contrast of groups [95% CI] [99.9% CI] 
  Believable fake vs. Genuine Unbelievable fake vs. 
Genuine 
Unbelievable fake vs. 
Believable fake 
Protesters (# per 1000) 1, 2, 3 0.70  
[0.50, 0.90] 
[0.36, 1.04] 
0.50 
[0.30, 0.70] 
[0.16, 0.84] 
-0.20 
[-0.40, 0.00] 
[-0.53, 0.14] 
Arrests (#) 1, 2, 3 0.32 
[0.12, 0.52] 
[-0.01, 0.66] 
0.43 
[0.23, 0.63] 
[0.09, 0.77] 
0.11 
[-0.09, 0.31] 
[-0.22, 0.45] 
Injuries (#) 1 0.08 
[-0.27, 0.43] 
[-0.50, 0.66] 
0.11 
[-0.23, 0.43] 
[-0.46, 0.67] 
0.05 
[-0.29, 0.40] 
[-0.52, 0.63] 
Police officers (#) 2 0.00 
[-0.37, 0.37] 
[-0.61, 0.61] 
0.07 
[-0.29, 0.44] 
[-0.54, 0.69] 
0.05 
[-0.31, 0.42] 
[-0.56, 0.66] 
Violence (Likert) 1, 2, 3 0.29 
[0.09, 0.50] 
[-0.05, 0.64] 
0.17 
[-0.05, 0.38] 
[-0.20, 0.53] 
-0.14 
[-0.34, 0.06] 
[-0.47, 0.20] 
Damage (Likert) 1 0.13 
[-0.22, 0.47] 
[-0.45, 0.70] 
0.06 
[-0.28, 0.39] 
[-0.50, 0.62] 
-0.06 
[-0.40, 0.27] 
[-0.63, 0.50] 
Smoothly (Likert) 1 -0.52 
[-0.87, -0.18] 
[-1.11, 0.06] 
-0.40 
[-0.74, -0.06] 
[-0.97, 0.17] 
0.13 
[-0.22, 0.47] 
[-0.45, 0.70] 
Police control (Likert) 1, 3 -0.19 
[-0.65, 0.26] 
[-0.96, 0.57] 
-0.22 
[-0.49, 0.06] 
[-0.67, 0.24] 
-0.02 
[-0.26, 0.22] 
[-0.42, 0.38] 
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Note: Effect size estimates are calculated using the A method described by Ruscio (2008), and converted to dA using the procedure described by Li (2016). 
Confidence intervals are calculated using ESCI software (Cumming, 2012). 
Note: ‘Believable fake’ here corresponds to the ‘Doctored’ condition of Experiment 1 and the ‘Well-doctored’ conditions of Experiments 2-3. ‘Unbelievable 
fake’ corresponds to the ‘Doctored-disclaimer’ condition of Experiment 1 and the ‘Badly-doctored’ conditions of Experiments 2-3. 
Note: Confidence intervals that exclude zero are presented in bold 
  
Supportive-self (Likert) 2, 3 -0.04 
[-0.39, 0.34] 
[-0.44, 0.37] 
-0.12 
[-0.40, -0.17] 
[-0.60, 0.36] 
-0.07 
[-0.35, 0.22] 
[-0.54, 0.41] 
Supportive-public (Likert) 2, 3 -0.13 
[-0.60, 0.34] 
[-0.92, 0.66] 
-0.17 
[-0.83, 0.50] 
[-1.29, 0.95] 
-0.01 
[-0.26, 0.23] 
[-0.43, 0.40] 
Positive-self (Likert) 2, 3 0.02 
[-0.23, 0.28] 
[-0.41, 0.45] 
-0.16 
[0.52, 0.20] 
[-0.77, 0.45] 
-0.20 
[-0.45, 0.05] 
[-0.62, 0.21] 
Positive-public (Likert) 2, 3 -0.06 
[-0.46, 0.35] 
[-0.74, 0.63] 
-0.12 
[-0.70, 0.46] 
[-1.10, 0.85] 
-0.07 
[-0.32, 0.18] 
[-0.48, 0.34] 
Attend in future (Likert) 1, 2, 3 -0.08 
[-0.28, 0.12] 
[-0.41, 0.25] 
0.02 
[-0.21, 0.25] 
[-0.37, 0.41] 
0.10 
[-0.10, 0.30] 
[-0.23, 0.43] 
Protest in future (Likert) 1, 2, 3 -0.01 
[-0.22, 0.21] 
[-0.37, 0.35] 
0.11 
[-0.09, 0.30] 
[-0.23, 0.44] 
0.12 
[-0.08, 0.31] 
[-0.22, 0.45] 
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Table S1. Sample sizes and effect size estimates (dA) for each pairwise contrast of conditions across target questions in each experiment. 
Question Experiment Group n Effect size dA for pairwise contrast 
  Genuine (A) Believable 
fake (B) 
Unbelievable 
fake (C) 
(B) vs. (A) (C) vs. (A) (C) vs. (B) 
Protesters (# per 1000) Experiment 1 66 64 71 0.8187 0.4758 -0.2699 
 Experiment 2 57 58 59 0.6954 0.6727 -0.0842 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.6049 0.3807 -0.2192 
Arrests (#) Experiment 1 65 62 70 0.3087 0.3640 0.0929 
 Experiment 2 57 58 59 0.3310 0.5330 0.1870 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.3270 0.3999 0.0714 
Injuries (#) Experiment 1 66 62 70 0.0813 0.1054 0.0544 
Police Officers (#) Experiment 2 57 58 59 0.0000 0.0736 0.0540 
Violence (Likert) Experiment 1 67 65 71 0.2940 0.1640 -0.1150 
 Experiment 2 57 58 59 0.3503 0.3643 0.0022 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.2411 -0.0282 -0.2759 
Damage (Likert) Experiment 1 67 65 71 0.1261 0.0572 -0.0626 
Smoothly (Likert) Experiment 1 67 65 71 -0.5233 -0.4023 0.1255 
Police control (Likert) Experiment 1 67 65 71 -0.4302 -0.3525 0.0794 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.0326 -0.0762 -0.1233 
Supportive-self (Likert) Experiment 2 57 58 59 -0.0245 -0.2730 -0.2243 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 -0.0446 0.0201 0.0673 
Supportive-public (Likert) Experiment 2 57 58 59 -0.3785 -0.5102 -0.0973 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.1029 0.1704 0.0611 
Positive-self (Likert) Experiment 2 57 58 59 -0.1245 -0.3544 -0.2667 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.1384 0.0154 -0.1443 
Positive-public (Likert) Experiment 2 57 58 59 -0.2718 -0.4245 -0.1723 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.1423 0.1686 0.0165 
Attend in future (Likert) Experiment 1 67 65 71 -0.1227 0.0503 0.1601 
 Experiment 2 57 58 59 -0.1594 -0.2127 -0.0699 
 Experiment 3 74 76 62 0.0241 0.2004 0.1870 
Protest in future (Likert) Experiment 1 67 65 71 0.1508 0.1690 0.0226 
 Experiment 2 57 58 59 0.0566 0.2478 0.1994 
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 Experiment 3 74 76 62 -0.2045 -0.0812 0.1365 
Note: Effect size estimates are calculated using the A method described by Ruscio (2008), and converted to dA using the procedure described by Li (2016) 
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Figure S1. Schematic representation of the photograph used in the Doctored-disclaimer condition of Experiment 1, demonstrating the position 
and prominence of the disclaimer (original image blurred). 
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